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Abstract This paper analyzes the economic and investment implications of a series of
climate mitigation scenarios, characterized by different levels of ambition for long-term
stabilization goals and transitional pathways. Results indicate that although milder climate
objectives can be achieved at moderate costs, stringent stabilization paths, compatible with
the 2◦C target, might require significant economic resources. Innovation and technology are
shown to be able to mitigate, but not structurally alter, this trade-off. Technologies that allow
capturing CO2 from the atmosphere are shown to be important for expanding the feasibility
space of stringent climate policies, though only if deployed at a scale which would represent
a tremendous challenge. In general, the analysis indicates that the timing of mitigation is
an important factor of cost containment, with early action being desirable. It also elaborates
on the set of mitigation strategies and policies that would be required to achieve climate
protection at maximum efficiency.
Keywords Climate policy · Stabilization costs
JEL Classification C72 · H23 · Q25 · Q28
1 Introduction
Although no clear consensus of a road map to reach the target has been reached yet, tem-
perature stabilization at no more than 2◦C above pre-industrial levels by the end of this
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century still represents the objective of most nations represented at the UNFCCC, and has
been recognized as a fundamental signpost in the Copenhagen and Cancun agreements. To
meet this challenge, greenhouse gas concentrations must be limited to at least 450 ppm CO2
equivalent (with a 50% likelihood) or below. This objective can be met by following differ-
ent emission pathways, which can be characterized by a greater or shorter delay in action.
As a consequence, this entails a reasonably rapid reduction of emissions in later periods.
This paper analyzes a set of scenarios aiming at different levels of ambition for long-term
climate objectives, the timing of initial commitment, and the pace of decarbonization, by
means of a hybrid integrated assessment model (the WITCH model). It also assesses the role
of the available set of technologies, and two specific key technologies; carbon capture and
sequestration, which are associated with coal power plants and bioenergy power plants. The
latter allows absorbing CO2 from the atmosphere, and thus potentially achieving negative
emissions.
The main finding of this exercise can be summarized as follows:
(a) Potentially significant costs. Although milder climate objectives can be achieved at
low costs, stringent stabilization compatible with the 2◦C target might have important
economic repercussions (costs measured as discounted GWP losses range between 4
and 7%, depending on the choice of the discount rate). The costs of such policies cru-
cially depend on when the transition to a lower carbon society starts, as well as on the
range of mitigation options, the pace of technological innovation and the feasibility of
the large-scale removal of CO2 from the atmosphere.
(b) Early action. Action timing influences the cost of meeting a target as well the stringency
of the targets we can aspire to. Especially for ambitious targets, early action is crucial.
Delayed action implies a higher post peak reduction rate, which in turn results in a
replacement of capital that is more costly as it is more abrupt. Delaying the emissions
peak period to 2030 makes the most stringent set of targets unattainable. Only under
the optimistic assumption of large-scale CO2 removal can the tradeoff between costs
and timing of action be less severe.
(c) Wide mitigation portfolio. Renewables, CCS, nuclear, REDD, and innovation (R&D)
are all crucial options to minimize stabilization costs. Renewable technologies and
carbon-free innovation should be incentivized through appropriate policies. Moreover,
negative emissions technologies are crucial for the attainability and costs of stringent
policy cases.
(d) Energy Consumption. Strong reductions in energy consumption through enhanced
energy efficiency and life-style changes are needed to achieve a low-carbon economy.
(e) Second best. The analysis of the cost of climate policies carried out in many other
quantitative assessments contains several idealistic assumptions. These assumptions
could be violated in the real world where some technologies may not be fully avail-
able, technology transfers and diffusion may be imperfect, some world regions may not
accept to reduce their own GHG emissions, trading may be limited to some sectors or
to a fraction of the total abatement effort. This would increase the challenge of climate
protection and the costs of reducing GHG emissions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the modeling tool used for anal-
ysis. Section 3 describes the main characteristics of the emission paths considered. Section 4
discusses the main results, while Sect. 5 investigates the technological dimensions of CCS
and negative emissions mitigation options. Section 6 concludes presenting future avenues
for research.
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2 The WITCH Model
WITCH (Bosetti et al. 2006) is a climate-energy-economy model designed to assist in the
study of the socio-economic dimensions of climate change. It is structured to provide infor-
mation on the optimal responses of world economies to climate damages and to identify the
impacts of climate policy on global and regional economic systems. A thorough description
and a list of related papers and applications are available at www.feem-web.it/witch.
It should be underlined that WITCH does not reflect the current financial crisis. Because
it is a long-term projection tool, WITCH is not suited to match short-term disruptions, which
are smoothed out on the century-time scale.
The following four features of WITCH should be highlighted:
• Foresightedness of decision makers;
• Mitigation options;
• Specification of technological change in the energy sector;
• Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD).
A key attribute of the WITCH model for our analysis is that it assumes governments to
be forward-looking. If a policy is enforced, then each region’s policy maker anticipates its
arrival. Investments in the energy sector and in innovation are made to avoid a lock-in effect.
Policy makers consider the prospective target, even if they do not face it in the immediate
future, and choose investments keeping in mind the time needed for polluting capital to wear
off and the penetration limits of carbon-free technologies. Such features of the model only
partially reproduce reality, where policy makers generally have a more myopic perspective.
Hence, the perfect foresight feature might play a role in underestimating the costs of climate
policy (see Bosetti et al. 2009b and Blanford et al. 2009 or a detailed discussion of this issue).
The WITCH model features a series of mitigation options in both the power generation sector
and in the other energy carriers, for instance, in the non-electric sector. Mitigation options in
the power sector include nuclear, hydroelectric, IGCC-CCS, renewables, bioenergy burning
with CCS, and a backstop option that can substitute nuclear. In the non-electricity sector,
mitigation options include advanced biofuel and a backstop option that can substitute oil.
Two other important mitigation options are the endogenous improvement of overall energy
efficiency with dedicated energy R&D and reducing emissions from deforestation and deg-
radation (REDD).
Energy saving is believed to be one of the most convenient mitigation options. In the
model, investment in energy saving knowledge is modeled to cumulate in a knowledge stock
which substitutes energy inputs to produce energy services. Therefore, rather than being mod-
eled as an autonomous process, improvement in energy efficiency is the product of specific
investments.
In the longer-term, however, one could envision the possible development of innovative
technologies with low or zero carbon emissions. These technologies, which are currently far
from being commercial, are usually referred to in the literature as backstop technologies,
and are available in large supplies. For the purpose of modeling, a backstop technology can
be better thought of as a compact representation of an advanced technologies portfolio that
would ease the mitigation burden away from currently commercial options, though it would
be available in a few decades. Given that these technologies are not explicitly specified, we
do not need to choose a winner but simply assume that through R&D investments one or
the other potential alternative will become available at a competitive cost in the future. This
representation has the advantage of maintaining simplicity in the model by limiting the array
of future energy technologies and thus the dimensionality of techno-economic parameters
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for which reliable estimates and meaningful modeling characterization do not exist. WITCH
includes two backstop technologies, one in the electric and one in the non-electric sector,
that require dedicated innovation investments to become economically competitive, even in
a scenario with a climate policy. We have followed the most recent characterization in the
technology and climate change literature, modeling the costs of the backstop technologies
with a two-factor learning curve in which their price declines with both investments in dedi-
cated R&D and technology diffusion. Forestry is an important contributor of CO2 emissions
and it might provide relatively convenient abatement opportunities. WITCH is enhanced with
baseline emissions and supply mitigation curves for reduced deforestation. Abatement curves
for world tropical forests are based on the IIASA cluster model (Eliasch 2008). Bosetti et al.
(2009a) described the results of this analysis in depth. The supply cost curves of biomass
for bioenergy and CCShave been generated by the GLOBIOM land use model, developed at
IIASA.1
3 Scenario Design
The scenarios designed for this modeling exercise have been chosen to test a range of asser-
tions. These scenarios are described in detail in Table 1 and Fig. 1 and can be placed into
three main categories:
• Scenarios 1–4: These achieve a 2◦C stabilization target with a probability close to 50%
(except scenario 4) and assess the sensitivity of global mitigation costs to early action.
• Scenarios 5–7: These achieve a stabilization target of more than 2◦C and test if, in case
of somewhat even lower ambitious stabilization targets, early action is still worthwhile.
• Scenarios 7–9: These are a range of scenarios that peak in 2020 with different post-peak
reduction rates, and aim to assess the impact of more aggressive post-peak reduction rates
on the global mitigation costs.
Summary statistics for the nine scenarios are shown in Table 1. Emission and abatement
paths over time are shown in Fig. 1.
The aim of the analysis is to determine the different implications of these global carbon
emission trajectories, with different ambition levels for long-term climate objectives, as well
as the timing of initial commitment and pace of decarbonization. Furthermore, in the second
part of the paper we consider an additional dimension of analysis and evaluate the same nine
scenarios under two opposite technological scenarios; a pessimistic one in which CCS is
not viable and an optimistic one in which we allow for large-scale deployment of negative
emissions technologies.
Scenarios assuming a slower pace of decarbonization in the early period can also be
interpreted as scenarios in which only a subset of countries has accepted to curb emissions
while the rest of the world’s regions agree to keep their emissions at their business-as-usual
levels and only start to accept binding targets at a later point. It is noticeable that the latter
is the direction emerging from the latest rounds of negotiation within the UNFCCC. Indeed,
the Copenhagen pledges for 2020 that were presented during the 2010 Cancun meeting of
the parties imply business-as-usual non-binding targets for many emerging economies.
Therefore, we do not model the first-best scenario for a given temperature target (which
would imply a single optimal path of emission reductions, where emission reductions are
allocated optimally through time, for instance minimizing the consumption loss required to
1 http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/FOR/globiom.html?sb=13.
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Fig. 1 Left panel Emission pathways for scenarios 1 to 9. Right panel Abatement effort for scenarios 1 to 9,
according to the baseline emissions of the WITCH model
meet the temperature target), rather we measure the costs of alternative sub-optimal path-
ways.2 Although scenarios mimic different levels of early commitments from different areas
of the world we assume a perfect international carbon market is in place with no limits
on carbon transfers and no transaction costs. Marginal abatement costs are thus equalized
globally, and maximum economic efficiency is attained, irrespective of the burden-sharing
scheme adopted (as the focus of the paper is on global costs we do not investigate regional
issues). All countries are assumed to take part in the international climate agreement as soon
as it is established, even though they might simply agree on emission allowances equal to
their baseline level.
The model features perfect foresight, allowing for anticipatory mitigation actions in
response to future targets. Economic agents prepare for the transition to low-carbon sce-
narios by building up efficient capital stock in advance, and thus mitigate the shocks of early
capital retirement or sudden deployment of new technologies. The anticipation of a future
policy target induces a smoother transition, leading to a change in the investment choices
even before the policy is actually implemented (to avoid lock-in in long-lived carbon-inten-
sive capital). On the other hand, the assumption of a completely myopic behavior, before the
starting date of the policy, would increase the costs of the policy. The anticipation effect has
been shown to be important in determining the investment strategies and costs of climate
policies (Bosetti et al. 2009b, Blanford et al. 2009).
Emissions in the WITCH model (the baseline and the main emission drivers are described
in greater detail in “Appendix”) are endogenous as well as the results of the investment deci-
sions in the energy sectors. Fossil fuel CO2 emissions grow from the current 30 GtCO2, to 47
in 2030, in line with the B2 SRES scenarios. By 2030, WITCH emissions are 10% above the
forecasts of the Energy Information Agency and the International Energy Agency. By 2100,
fossil fuel emissions grow to 86 GtCO2, slightly above the B2 SRES scenario group. More
(less) optimistic assumptions on fossil fuel resources’ availability or on economic growth
would lead to higher (lower) emissions in the baseline; henceforth the climate constrained
scenarios would imply larger (smaller) abatement efforts and costs. The 2100 figure is within
the average of more recent modeling comparisons (see Fig. 11 for a comparison of the latest
baseline emission pathways within the EMF 22 comparison exercise).
2 We decided not to look into the effect of banking as a way of smoothing out emission reductions given
the long-term nature of the proposed policies. In addition, the chief scope of the present analysis is to look
at the effects of alternative pathways thoroughly. We examined the effect of banking on policy costs in two
previous studies (Bosetti et al. 2008 and Bosetti et al. 2009a) and found that full “when flexibility” results in a
reduction of policy costs of 10–15%. The magnitude of the effect depends on the scenario (and whether there
is a combined effect with REDD or not).
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4 Presentation and Discussion of Main Results
This section presents the reference results of the analysis by comparing 9 scenarios on two
main variables of interest, namely the implications for the economy and those for energy
investments.
4.1 Macro-Economic Implications
We begin by reporting the global economic implications of the various climate mitigation
scenarios, focusing on the costs of meeting the different emission trajectories. Gross policy
costs will be presented, without considering the benefits from avoided climate change.
Figure 2 shows the global GDP losses regarding the baseline across the various scenarios
and times. Several patterns are identifiable. Keeping the temperature increase at the end of
the century between 2.5 and 3◦C (scenarios “2020 peak—2.74◦C” and “2030 peak—3◦C”)
entails very contained costs that hardly exceed 1% of GWP and that decline in the second
half of the century thanks to technological progress. Economic losses increase for the more
stringent scenarios, but remain below 5% for a 2.4◦C objective. However, they rise very
rapidly for temperatures close to (albeit always slightly higher than) the 2◦C objective set
forth by the EU and the G8. In the latter class of scenarios, global GDP losses can be as much
as 10% and begin accruing earlier in time. Within this class of stringent mitigation policies,
the scenario which shows lower costs is surprisingly not the one in which mitigation actions
should start immediately (scenario “2014 peak—2.05◦C”).
The “2030 peak—2.36◦C” scenario, which entails postponing the peak in emissions until
2030, is unfeasible to run with the WITCH framework. The speed of decarbonization required
to meet the 2◦C target and, at the same time, to allow for such a late start is such that the
model crosses the boundary of reasonable assumptions and no feasible solution can be found.
Inertia and fossil fuel capital accumulation, on the one hand, and investments, infrastructure
and capacity building needed to cope with the sudden change, on the other, would not be in
line with what we have seen in the past and what we can reasonably project in the future. Even
if some radical innovation will soon be available, time is required for the necessary changes
in infrastructure and to allow for the new technology to pervade. Given these constraints,
Fig. 2 Gross world product (GWP) losses over the century. The legend shows the scenario number and
(in brackets) its median temperature change in 2100 in degree Celsius. Scenario 4 is not feasible
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Fig. 3 Gross world product (GWP) losses in net present value (NPV), with a discount rate of 5% (lower part
of the bar) and 3% (whole bar). Each series is defined by the scenario number and (in brackets) its median
temperature change in 2100 in degree Celsius
the “2030 peak—2.36◦C” scenario implies a pace of change in the energy sector that is too
abrupt for the model to find a feasible solution.3
Figure 3 reports a more compact measure of costs, in which losses are actualized in today’s
terms at 5 and 3% discount rates. The above graph clearly shows that approaching the 2◦C
objective will most likely have important economic repercussions, with present term GWP
losses from 3.5 to 5.5% within the 2015–2100 period, depending on the discount rate.
Delaying action by only a few years is shown to negatively affect costs; for example the
“2020 peak—2.08◦C” scenario, despite achieving a somewhat higher temperature than the
“2014 peak—2.05◦C” scenario, entails costs that are higher in discounted terms, because it
postpones the peak year by 6 years (2020 as opposed to 2014). Stretching the delay further
in time as in the “2030 peak—2.36◦C” scenario, would make it impossible to comply with a
stringent stabilization objective, since the additional overshoot would require emission cuts
too sudden to be attained with the reference mitigation portfolio of the model.
The remaining scenarios show that relaxing the stabilization objective reduces the eco-
nomic penalty considerably, especially when the temperature objective is reduced by 0.5 to
1◦C, on average. However, one should recall the great uncertainties that surround the mapping
of concentrations into temperature changes.
Our modeling estimates suggest that attaining stringent stabilization objectives would
imply relatively high costs, but that moderate objectives can be accomplished at a much
smaller charge. Table 2 compares our figures with those made for the IPCC 4th AR and
the CCSP study.4 The most stringent scenarios were not reproduced in the CCSP study. For
the less stringent categories the WITCH results lie within the cost range of published esti-
mates. However, for more ambitious scenarios closer to the 2◦C target, we report costs that
are substantially higher and range more widely. One should recall that, since only the most
optimistic models have been able to simulate stringent climate policies until now, published
3 An important, though not the only one, assumption is that capital depreciates but cannot be scrapped earlier.
Given this assumption, which is extremely realistic from a political view point, the scenario is unfeasible. We
shall see later how, assuming negative emissions technologies are available makes this scenario feasible.
4 CCSP is the US Climate Change Science Program, the most acknowledged modeling comparison exercise
in the US (Clarke et al. 2007).
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Table 2 Policy cost comparison (measured as GDP losses in 2050)
GDP reduction in 2050
IPCC 4th AR estimates CCSP WITCH AVOID study
445–535 ppm CO2e
(2014 peak—2.05◦C,
2016 peak—2.02◦C,
2020 peak—2.08◦C,
2020 peak—2.25◦C,
2020 peak—2.12◦C)
<5.5% NA 4.2–9.4%
535–590 ppm CO2e
(2020 peak—2.41◦C
2020 peak—2.74◦C)
Slightly negative to 4% 1.2–4.1%* 1.2–2.3%
590–710 ppm CO2e
(2030 peak—3◦C)
−1 to 2% 0–1.2% 1.1%
* This figure refers to 2040, as 2050 is not reported in the CCSP study
estimates of the costs of stringent stabilization scenarios are likely to be biased towards costs
that are too low, as shown in Tavoni and Tol (2009).
Moreover, WITCH fully models the limited substitutability and the inertia characterizing
the energy sector as well as the limited availability of carbon-free alternatives for the trans-
port sector. Overall, WITCH envisions low-carbon alternatives in the non-electricity sector
to penetrate slowly, thus limiting the decarbonization of the sector. Consequently, a signifi-
cant decline of primary energy demand is required. This contraction of non-electric energy
supply leads to a substantial decrease in macro-economic productivity. In addition, rather
than being an autonomous process, innovation within WITCH is modeled as depending on
R&D expenditures. These factors contribute to the realism of the modeling experiment but
result in higher costs.
For the transition to a low-carbon society to take place, several policy instruments are
likely to be needed, and one in particular will be indispensable. Carbon should be priced
considerably high to foster the changes needed on both the supply and demand sides. Our
calculations suggest that ambitious scenarios would require a price above 100$/tCO2-eq by
2025, even assuming a totally flexible international carbon market with no ex-ante constraints
on offsets. Such prices are needed to foster substantial investments in the energy sector, in
innovation, and in land conservation as shown in the next section. Figure 4 indicates carbon
prices for the policy scenarios in between 2015 and 2030. It shows that the more stringent
scenarios require a strong price signal from earlier periods, but that a growing carbon cost
is needed across all scenarios. As already noted, one should recall that higher carbon prices
can be obtained if we relax the assumption of an unrestricted international carbon market
equalizing marginal abatement costs.
Despite being a stringent scenario, the “2020 peak—2.08◦C” scenario has an initial carbon
price lower than the “2014 peak—2.05◦C” and ”2016 peak—2.02◦C” scenarios (though it
is compensated for in subsequent periods) given the larger emission overshoot. Also, given
the anticipation of very stringent emission reductions in the future, significant investment
effort is applied to improve energy and carbon efficiencies, which lowers the abatement costs
and contains the price of carbon at the outset. Nonetheless, such investments have important
economic consequences, as shown in Fig. 2; this suggests that carbon prices are only partial
indicators of the macro-economic costs of policies.
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Fig. 4 Carbon permit price in 2005 in USD per ton CO2 equivalent, log scale
Fig. 5 Savings and low-carbon options in primary energy throughout the century
4.2 Mitigation Strategies
To achieve climate mitigation, a vast portfolio of mitigation solutions is required, encom-
passing several technologies and sectors. The actions required in the energy sector, the most
important contributor of carbon emissions, are shown in Fig. 5. The graph indicates that a
range of options should be pursued concurrently. Renewables such as wind, solar, biomass
and advanced fuels such as bio-energy are expected to play an especially important role in
meeting the world energy demand at a low-carbon rate. The same applies for nuclear and
coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS), which will ensure the stability of the power
generation base-load. Each of them will come with drawbacks, either with land utilization,
waste management and proliferation risks, or coal extraction.
One striking feature of this chart is that, throughout the century, the various emission
pathways require a rather similar reallocation of the supply towards a diversified portfolio of
the above mentioned low-carbon energy options. What obviously changes across scenarios
is the speed at which this transition is implemented. Changes on the demand side are shown
to be equally, if not more, important than supply restructuring, especially for the case of
ambitious climate scenarios. The demand cuts will need to be achieved by enhanced energy
123
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Fig. 6 Investments in energy
R&D. Each series is defined by
the scenario number and
(in brackets) its median
temperature change in 2100 in
degree Celsius
efficiency, and this indeed is a key mitigation option, especially in the early periods, but also
through demand side management measures.
An additional and important issue regards innovation. Technological advancement, espe-
cially for clean fuels, will be indispensable to mitigate GHG emissions. To generate this
change, substantial investments in clean energy R&D will be needed. The model logic allows
the endogenous calculation of such resource needs, which are shown in Fig. 6. Roughly up
to 600 billion USD per decade will need to be mobilized in the next 30 years to meet the
technological change requirements of stringent stabilization targets, roughly repartitioned
equally over time (in Fig. 6 numbers are given in present terms).
Although these figures are significantly larger (up to 10 times) than what has been invested
in the recent past, they represent a share of GDP similar to that of the peak of energy R&D
activities in 1980. These figures are small when compared to the investments needed in the
installation of new low-carbon capital, thus representing an efficient hedging strategy (Bosetti
et al. 2009c). Figure 6 also suggests that the size of R&D investments varies quite consider-
ably across stringent and mild scenarios. The difference between the R&D programs of the
emission pathways is especially evident for the investment needs in the next two decades.
However, all the emissions pathways consistent with a temperature increase below 2.5 Cel-
sius require a large and immediate research program, with important repercussions on the
size and composition of short-term resources.
Finally, emissions should be reduced in all sectors of the economy, not only in the energy
one. Our analysis envisions substantial mitigation in CH4, N2O and CO2 from land use
change. The latter, especially through tropical deforestation, represents a particularly rel-
evant source of current emissions, and its solution is deemed economical and has various
additional co-benefits.
For the more stringent scenarios, we find reduced emissions from deforestation and land
degradation (REDD) in the order of 2.7 GtCO2 in 2020, mostly in South America and South
East Asia. For this to be viable, necessary institutions that monitor and verify emission reduc-
tions will need to be quickly established in major countries such as Brazil and Indonesia.
5 Exploring the Role of CCS and Negative Emissions Technologies
The analysis presented so far has highlighted an important tradeoff between climate effec-
tiveness and economic costs of implementing climate mitigation pathways. The non linearity
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Fig. 7 The climate policy costs trade off
of the relation between these two variables depends upon the shape of the marginal abatement
costs which are implicit in the model, and which depend upon the assumptions about com-
petitiveness and evolution of the technological frontier. This also has important implications
for the timing of mitigation, one of the key issues explored in this paper, since more (less)
optimistic assumptions about technology could result in later (earlier) mitigation action.
We address these issues in this section by exploring two opposing technological views.
The first case is labeled no CCS, in which carbon capture and storage (CCS) is assumed not
to be viable, either for technological or social reasons. The second case is labeled negative
emissions, in which CCS works and furthers technologies that allow capturing CO2 from the
atmosphere (such as burning biomass and storing CO2 in the ground), are assumed deploy-
able at large-scale. These two opposite cases, each of which we run for all the nine scenarios
under examination, allow us to explore the sensitivity of the results presented so far in the
role of technology. Negative emission technologies have been shown to play a major role on
the feasibility of stringent climate policies (Azar et al. 2010; Clarke et al. 2009), but have also
raised issues about the reliability of model comparison exercise results (Tavoni and Tol 2009).
Results are summarized in Fig. 7, which plots the costs of implementing the var-
ious emission scenarios under the three technological cases (reference, no CCS and
negative emissions). The series is labeled only for the no CCS scenario, as the reference
and negative emissions scenarios reproduce the same trend though shifted (the only notice-
able difference is for the “2030 peak—2.36◦C” scenario emission path which is only visible
for the negative emission scenario, as it is unfeasible under the other two). The plot indi-
cates a quite clear tradeoff between climate protection and economic activity. The relation
is highly non-linear. Achieving additional temperature reductions will call for more than
proportional losses of GDP. In addition, if stringent targets are envisioned, early action is
important. An early start would allow the achievement of more ambitious targets at lower
costs, or vice versa, which can be clearly seen by comparing the “2014 peak—2.05◦C” and,
”2016 peak—2.02◦C”, “2020 peak—2.08◦C” and ” 2020 peak—2.12◦C” scenarios.
The chart indicates that the role of technology availability has consequences on the level of
total compliance costs, in the expected direction of increasing (lowering) the costs in case of
less (more) technological availability. In the case of the optimistic scenario with large-scale
negative emissions, the “2030 peak–2.36◦C” scenario, which previously proved infeasible
because it is characterized by the postponement of mitigation activity from early to later
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Fig. 8 The impact of technology on policy costs
periods, is now achievable thanks to the possibility of absorbing CO2. Note though, that
this scenario remains inefficient regarding the neighboring “2020 peak—2.41◦C”and “2020
peak—2.25◦C” scenarios. At the other end of the spectrum, the case without CCS shows that
higher costs are needed for the same level of climate protection, but all scenarios feasible in
the reference case remain so in this case, since the lost mitigation potential of CCS is made
up by the greater share of renewables and nuclear power.
Technology, though, doesn’t seem capable of breaking the climate-policy costs tradeoffs:
policy costs remain clearly convex in the temperature increase goal. We further elaborate on
the impact of technology on policy costs in Fig. 8, which plots the cost difference between
the two opposite technological cases regarding the reference model. The chart shows that the
value of technology increases with the ambition of the climate goal because each technolog-
ical option gains in importance the tougher the climate objectives become, but also because
the cost levels increase with the stringency of the climate target, precisely for the reasons
outlined above.
Figure 7 shows the tradeoff between climate protection and economic activity, character-
ized by a non linear relation: achieving additional temperature reductions will require more
than proportional losses of GDP. We summarize this relation by means of a simple econo-
metric investigation of the 24 scenarios, whose results are reported in Table 3. The analysis
indicates that the stringency of the climate objective (measured by the temperature increase)
is a strong predictor of the policy costs (in logarithm). Technology is shown to be capable of
lowering the policy bill, thanks to CCS and especially to negative emission technologies.
Finally, the analysis clears up the timing of mitigation issue. Results indicate that rapid
decarbonization transitions (measured by the post-peak emission reduction rate) are costly,
thus indicating that early action is important.
The intuition for this result is that the capital turnover for energy is particularly low, and
thus the transition to decarbonization needs to be gradual, to avoid costly early capital retire-
ment. However, this result is reverted if we allow large-scale deployment of negative emission
technologies: the interaction term of the speed of decarbonization and the availability of neg-
ative emission technologies has a sign which is opposite and larger in magnitude, suggesting
that in the presence of these technological options it might be optimal to somewhat defer
abatement to later periods, since CO2 absorption from the atmosphere would allow us a much
more rapid and profound shift to a low-carbon economy.
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Table 3 OLS analysis of scenario results (dependent variable = log of NPV GDP loss, number of obs = 24,
adj. Rˆ2 = .97)
Coef. Std. Err. t P > t [95% Conf. Interval]
Temperature −2.84 .203 0.000 −3.26978 to -2.415807
Negative emissions technology dummy −1.05 .173 0.000 −1.422195 to −.6947898
CCS dummy −.226 .086 0.017 −.40879 to −.0450831
Post peak reduction 16.89 5.65 0.008 5.008252 to 28.77745
Interaction term between post-peak
red. and negative emis. tech
−20.97 4.99 0.001 −31.472 to −10.47316
Constant 2.87 .601 0.000 1.61049 to 4.136906
Fig. 9 Global, cumulative CO2 captured from the atmosphere across scenarios
There is one important warning to keep in mind when considering the optimality of
deferred emission reduction when negative emissions are available: The technological chal-
lenge of deploying negative emission technologies should not be underestimated.
It is important to note that the scale of implementation of negative emission technologies
consistent with the technological optimistic (negative emissions) scenarios are considerable.
Figure 9 shows the amount of CO2 that would be captured from the atmosphere and stored
underground with negative emission technologies.5 Cumulatively throughout century, up to
approximately 400 GtCO2 would be captured. Even though most capturing activity would
happen in the second half of the century, when innovation in agriculture could have sub-
stantially changed land productivity, the bioenergy feedstock requirement (up to 80 EJ/year)
5 Note that these are higher than the net negative emissions, since the model assumes positive lifecycle
emissions associated with the growing and harvesting of biomass.
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would still be considerable, with potential implications on land use, biodiversity and water
resources, let alone availability of sites for CO2 storage.
6 Conclusions
To conclude we would like to express a word of caution. Models are a partial representa-
tion of reality and rest on important assumptions. The analysis performed here is almost a
first-best world, with full international participation, a perfect international carbon market,
and foresight of future climate obligations. In reality, departures from all or many of these
assumptions are likely to occur and would result in potentially higher economic penalties.
First, it is likely that global participation is only reached after a set of partial agreements
are put into place first. In particular, it is very likely that developing countries will not take
action, not even based on non-binding targets. The latest Energy Modeling Forum exercise
(EMF 22, Clarke et al. 2009) showed that the penalty of such second-best scenarios can be
substantial. More stringent stabilization scenarios can be eventually ruled out if developing
countries delay their participation.
Regarding recommendations for future research, this paper has shown that the set of tech-
nologies that will be available, and the speed at which they will be deployed, significantly
affect not only the costs of any climate policy, but also the time we can wait without entering
an irreversible path. The stricter the climate objective or the later the mitigation effort starts,
the more will we need to resort to technologies which have potential implications that we
have not yet understood. This obviously requires a careful and realistic estimation of the
costs and potentials of these technologies, the RD&D requirements to make them available
with a reasonable level of certainty, and the potential barriers and external costs that might
be linked to their deployment on a large-scale. From a political viewpoint, betting on the
unconstrained availability of some negative emissions technologies in the second half of the
century is appealing, hence it is important to keep track of the feasibility and of the costs
of decarbonization paths with and without these technological solutions. A logical next step
is to include the uncertain availability of these technologies in the analysis and perform a
fully stochastic investigation on the RD&D needs, potential costs, and hedging strategies
when innovation is not a given and deterministic process. Finally, the paper has dealt with
the global costs of climate policy. However, within the negotiation debates the distribution of
costs will matter as much, if not more. A thorough investigation of the regional implications
of different allocations schemes across the scenarios would warrant further research.
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Appendix: WITCH Baseline Emissions
Assumptions on baseline emissions are a crucial driver of climate policy costs as they influ-
ence the necessary effort to curb emissions. In the following we describe the drivers of
emissions in the model baseline and how it stands regarding that of other models. One of the
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Fig. 10 Components of CO2 emissions: historical data and future path
Fig. 11 Energy-related CO2 emissions in the baseline for models participating in the EMF22 exercise (Clarke
et al. 2009)
main drivers in the difference between baselines is the fossil fuel availability assumption, as
more optimistic assumptions will lead to higher estimates of policy costs.
Figure 10 distinguishes the different drivers of GHG emissions in the WITCH baseline,
following Kaya’s decomposition of total emissions (EMI) into carbon intensity of energy
(EMI/EN), energy intensity of the economy (EN/GDP), per capita GDP (GDP/POP) and
population. The left part of the graph shows the historical components of GHG emissions
observed over the past thirty years, whereas the right panel depicts the long-term trends
produced by the model in the baseline up to 2100. Historically, per capita GDP and popula-
tion have been the major determinants of emission growth, whereas improvements in carbon
intensity have had the opposite effect of reducing emissions.
The long-term scenario is still characterized by the predominant role of economic growth,
whereas the role of population fades over time. Economic growth, measured for per capita
GDP, is the major driver of GHG emissions throughout the entire century whereas popu-
lation growth contributes to the increase in GHG emissions up to 2075, when population
starts to follow a slightly negative trend. A decrease in energy intensity has a positive effect
on emission reduction, which, however, is not large enough to compensate for the pressure
of economic and population growth. The carbon content of energy remains rather constant
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over time, with a slight carbonization of energy due to an increase in coal consumption in
fast-growing countries like China and India.
When compared to other integrated assessment models, WITCH positions itself in the
middle range of baseline emissions. Figure 11 shows the energy-related CO2 emissions pro-
jected in a baseline scenario by the models that participated in the recent EMF22 comparison
exercise (Clarke et al. 2009).6 The chart shows that WITCH fossil fuel CO2 emissions grow
from the current 30 GtCO2, to 47 in 2030 and 86 in 2100, in line with the average of the
various scenarios. In the shorter run of 2030, WITCH emissions are somewhat (roughly 10%)
above the forecasts of the Energy Information Agency and the International Energy Agency.
The baseline emissions from land use of CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gases are exoge-
nous inputs to the model, and have been taken from the literature.
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